Marquette Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 3 Spring 1997: Speeches and Essays

Article 12

Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The State's
Current Approach and the Novel Approach of
Court-Ordered Protective Custody of the Fetus
Cynthia L. Glaze

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Cynthia L. Glaze, Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The State's Current Approach and the Novel Approach of Court-Ordered Protective
Custody of the Fetus, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 793 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol80/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

COMBATING PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE:
THE STATE'S CURRENT APPROACH AND THE
NOVEL APPROACH OF COURT-ORDERED
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY OF THE FETUS
I. INTRODUC-rION

Approximately one in every ten fetuses in the United States is
exposed to cocaine in the womb, which in turn affects 375,000 babies a
year.' Estimates show that eleven percent of pregnant women use
controlled substances' during pregnancy.3 The severe long-term effects
of cocaine and heroin on a baby, in addition to addiction and withdrawal
at birth, include low birth weight, short body length at birth, smaller
head circumference than normal infants, high incidence of physical
abnormalities such as deformed kidneys and neural tube defects, and an
increased likelihood of experiencing learning disabilities.4 The federal
government calculates that an infant prenatally exposed to illegal drugs
costs society about $1 million over its lifetime.5 Obviously these
statistics suggest that prenatal substance abuse is of national concern.
Individual states are searching for ways to approach and remedy this
problem. The goal of the state in this crisis appears to be two-fold: (1)
to penalize the mother for her illegal actions in an effort to deter the
problem, and (2) to protect potential life from subsequent medical
problems. In many states, prosecutors attempt to criminally charge
mothers who have abused a controlled substance during pregnancy.6

1. Barry Siegel, In the Name of the Children- Get Treatment or Go to Jai4 One South
Carolina Hospital Tells Drug Abusing PregnantWomen. Now it Faces a Lawsuit and Civil
Rights Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at 14.
2. Controlled substances are defined as, "[a]ny drug so designated by law whose
availability is restricted; Le., so designated by federal or state Controlled Substances
Acts .... Included in such classification are narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens,
and marijuana." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 329 (6th ed. 1990). For purposes of this
Comment, the term "controlled substances" will be used interchangeably with "illegal drugs."
3. Legal Interventions DuringPregnancy: Court-OrderedMedical Treatments and Legal
Penaltiesfor PotentiallyHarmful Behavior by PregnantWomen, 264 JAMA 2666, 2669 (1990)
[hereinafter Legal Interventions]. See, e.g., Joseph J. Volpe, Mechanisms of Disease. Effect
of Cocaine Use on the Fetus, 327 NEw ENG. J.MED. 399 (1992); Lawrence J. Nelson et al.,
Forced Medical Treatment of PregnantWomen: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to
the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 711 (1986).
4. See Legal Interventions,supra note 3, at 2666.
5. Richard Whitmire, Drug-Using, Pregnant Women: Medical or Criminal Problem?,
GANNETr NEwS SERVICE, Mar. 30, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL 11251843.
6. See infra notes 38-67 and accompanying text.
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However, without a statute covering such actions, their efforts have been
futile when reviewed by the courts. Although criminal prosecution of
mothers achieves the state's goal of penalizing the mother, it is
questionable how the state is promoting or protecting the health of the
fetus by such actions. Therefore, a better way to achieve the state's
goals must exist.
In September, 1995, the state of Wisconsin took a novel approach
toward protecting potential life from subsequent medical problems.7
The approach was not criminal prosecution; rather, it was the assertion
of civil child neglect and the request for court-ordered protective custody
of a viable fetus whose mother had tested positive for controlled
substances multiple times during her pregnancy.' Upon review of the
state's actions, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the court-ordered
protective custody and found that a fetus was a child under the
Wisconsin's Children's Code.9 Therefore, the state was able to both
punish the mother and protect the health of the unborn fetus through
protective custody in a local hospital.
This Comment examines the different approaches taken by states to
remedy prenatal substance abuse and analyzes the effectiveness of each
approach in attaining both of the states' previously mentioned goals.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the constitutional and legal status of
the fetus and consider the states' interest in protecting the fetus. Part III
will then analyze the judicial and legislative reactions to state prosecutors' attempts at criminally charging women for substance abuse during
pregnancy. Part IV addresses the novel approach taken by Wisconsin
and the judicial response to this approach as reflected in State ex rel.
Angela M.W v. Kruzicki. ° Finally, Part V analyzes the merits of
court-ordered detentions of substance-abusing pregnant women and
argues that legislative reform is needed to effectuate the states' goals.

7. See State ex rel Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532,541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App.
1995), cert. granted, 546 N.W.2d (Wis. 1996).
8. Id.
9. Id, at 571,541 N.W.2d at 497. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin heard oral arguments
on this case in October, 1996. At the time of publication, the Supreme Court had yet to issue
an opinion affirming or rejecting the Court of Appeals decision.
Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes is entitled "The Children's Code." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.01(1)(a) (West 1997).
10. 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 N.W.2d 482.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE FETUS

AND THE STATES' INTEREST IN THE FETUS

Courts raise and consider many questions when looking at prenatal
substance abuse. What power does the state have to protect the unborn
fetus? Do states' rights outweigh the rights of the pregnant mother? To
what extent can the state act to protect the fetus? To what extent can
the state punish the mother for her use of an illegal substance during
pregnancy that subsequently impairs the newborn? To answer these
questions, the courts consistently
review and apply the decision of Roe
12
progeny.
its
and
v. Wade"
The landmark case of Roe recognized a woman's constitutional right
to an abortion, with constraints effectuated by a trimester framework. 3
The Court held the woman's right to an abortion was not absolute:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological
justification. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother. 4
Although the Court recognized the state's interest in protecting the fetus,
the fetus was not considered a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the fetus was not accorded any constitutional
rights. 5
In 1992, the Supreme Court altered Roe's trimester framework and
emphasized the state's interest in the promotion of potential life in
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. The state did not try to "protect" the fetus against a pregnant woman's actions until
after the legalization of abortion in Roe and the anti-abortion movement created thereafter.
CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLrrIcS OF FETAL

RIGHTS 3 (1993).

13. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The trimester framework was used to balance the
competing interests of a woman's right to choose an abortion and the state's interest in
promoting the potential life of a fetus. In the first trimester, a woman has the absolute right
to an abortion. In the second trimester, the state may regulate the abortion in ways
reasonably related to the health of the mother. In the third trimester, after viability, the state
may absolutely prohibit the fetus from being aborted, unless the mother's life is threatened
by the fetus. Id.
14. Id. at 163-64.
15. Id. at 158.
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'6 These two Supreme Court decisions
have been used as a basis for fetal rights, but debate exists between
women's rights advocates and fetal rights advocates over whether the
state's interest can be interpreted to extend beyond the scope of an
abortion.
Women's rights advocates interpret Roe and its progeny narrowly,
arguing that the state's right to intervene exists only in circumstances of
an abortion. 17 These advocates believe the Supreme Court set out the
life and health of the mother as a limiting factor on the state's interest
in potential life. 8 Even if Roe can be read to say that fetal rights exist,
women's rights advocates claim that the Supreme Court decisions19
always subordinate fetal rights to a woman's right to health and safety.'"
Therefore, the women's rights advocates hold the view that "any rights
a fetus may have are simply not compelling enough to override the
pregnant woman's clear and uncontested rights in making decisions
about her pregnant body."'"
On the other hand, fetal rights advocates broadly interpret Roe as
implying that the state's interest in potential life exists at conception, not
just upon viability.' Based on the decisions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services' and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,24 these advocates

believe the view that the fetus' independent legal rights exist before

16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice O'Connor reasoned that
it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only
the woman's liberty but also the State's "important and legitimate interest in
potential life." That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases.
Id. at 871.
17. Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered
Medical ProceduresDuring Pregnancy,57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 945-48 (1994).
18. Id. at 945-46.
19. These advocates rely on Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists and Colautti v. Franklin which stand for the proposition that a "trade-off"
between the life of the mother and the life of the fetus is impermissible. Ouellette, supra note
17, at 946-47 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)). See generally Nelson et al., supra
note 3, at 749-52.
20. Ouellette, supra note 17, at 947.
21. Id. at 948.
22. DANIELS, supra note 12, at 23.
23. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Webster upheld a provision in a Missouri statute which granted
the fetus "'all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens and
residents of this state."' Id. at 504 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986)).
24. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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In addition, such
viability was affirmed by the Supreme Court.'
advocates look at the rights already afforded to a fetus26 as justification
for extending fetal rights in other circumstances.'
Furthermore, fetal rights advocates believe that by choosing to carry
the pregnancy to term, the state's interest in protecting the fetus causes
"the woman [to lose] the [legal autonomy] to act in ways that would
adversely affect the fetus."' One human rights advocate, who supports
restricting a substance-abusing pregnant woman's rights, claimed that a
woman does not have the right to "inflict a lifetime of suffering on her
future child simply in order to satisfy a momentary whim for a quick fix
.... [The woman's] right to abuse [her] own body stops at the border
of [her] womb."29
Obviously, in cases brought by the state against a woman for her
prenatal substance abuse, the state accepts the broad approach and
argues it has a compelling interest in protecting the potential life of the
fetus from its substance-abusing mother. Therefore, in order for the
state to permissibly intervene and alleviate the prenatal substance abuse
problem, the courts must be willing to accept the broad approach when
balancing the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life
against a woman's privacy rights during pregnancy.
A. CurrentRights Afforded an Unborn Fetus
States have increasingly afforded the fetus rights and legal status
under many statutes, despite the fetus' lack of full constitutional
protection.30 For purposes of inheritance in property law, states treat an
unborn child as a legal entity from the time of conception.3 ' Currently,

25. DANIELS, supra note 12, at 23-24.
26. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
27. DANIELS, supra note 12, at 13.
28. Id. at 25 (citation omitted). The view is that a woman has a duty or obligation to
care for the fetus and insure the birth of a healthy baby if the woman keeps the pregnancy.
Therefore, the woman's body becomes the body of the state and the woman may no longer
resist state intrusion. Id.
29. Id. at 26 (quoting Alan Dershowitz, Drawing the Line on Prenatal Rights, L.A.
TIMEs, May 14, 1989, at V5).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-60 (1973); see also supranote 15 and accompanying
text.
31. Tony Hartsoe, Personor Thing- In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey
of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 169, 237 (1995). See also Denise Kenneally
Cahalane, Note, Court-OrderedConfinement of PregnantWomen, 15 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 203, 208 (1989).
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every state recognizes a cause of action for tortious prenatal injury.32
In the criminal context, eight states recognize the killing of a viable fetus
to be homicide,33 five others have enacted feticide statutes, 34 and thirty
states, by judicial decision, have adopted the common law "born alive"
rule that if the child is born alive and dies, it is considered a homicide."
Furthermore, the fetus has attained the right to assert a federal civil
rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.36
Although several specific rights have been granted to the fetus, many
conflicts and inconsistencies exist as to when a fetus should be afforded
rights where the legislature has failed to specifically grant and define
those rights. The question then raised in the courts is whether the fetus
is a "person" or a "child" within the meaning of a particular statute.
III.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AS A REMEDY

State prosecutors have increasingly attempted to criminally charge
women for their prenatal substance abuse after the woman has given
birth. Some of these charges include involuntary manslaughter, assault
with a deadly weapon, child endangerment, child abuse, criminal neglect,
possession of a controlled substance, and delivery or distribution to a
minor.37 The principal issues for the court to consider in most of these
cases are whether a fetus is a child or person under the applicable statute
and whether the statute applies to substance abuse that occurred before
the birth of the child.
A. JudicialResponses
When reviewing criminal convictions, the courts consistently have
32. Hartsoe, supra note 31, at 206-07. For an exhaustive listing of the states and the
supporting cases, see id. at n.200. One commentator contends that tortious recovery "focuses
on the need for compensation of a living person wrongfully injured rather than on the legal
status of the fetus." Nelson et al., supra note 3, at 733.
33. Hartsoe, supra note 31, at 211-12. Of the eight states that recognize the unborn fetus
as a person for a homicide statute, three, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, are
based on the state supreme courts' interpretations of the statutes to include the fetus. Id. at
212 n.235. The other five states, California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Utah, have
enacted statutes directly addressing the killing of a fetus as homicide. Id. at 212 n.236.
34. Id. at 212-13. Instead of charging a person with homicide for killing a fetus, the
states with "feticide" statutes charge the person with manslaughter. The states that have these
statutes include Arizona, Florida, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Georgia. Id. at 213 n.237.
35. Id. at 211-12. For the judicial decisions of these thirty states, see id. at 212 n.233.
36. Id. at 235. See generally Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Fetus as Person on Whose
Behalf Action May be Brought Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, 64 A.L.R. FED. 886 (1983).
37. Sandra Anderson Garcia, DrugAddiction and Mother/Child Welfare: Rights, Laws
and DiscretionaryDecisionmaking, 13 J.LEGAL MED. 129, 140 n.45 (1992).
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held that a fetus is not considered a child or person under the applicable
criminal statute. The court seldom considers the state's compelling
interest in protecting the fetus.
1. Child Abuse/Neglect/Endangerment
Over the past ten years, prosecutors have attempted to bring criminal
charges of child neglect, child abuse, or child endangerment against new
mothers. One of the first reported cases criminally charging a woman
with child abuse for her prenatal substance abuse was In re Ruiz." In
1986, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, held that a
"child" under the child abuse statute included a viable fetus.3 9 Therefore, a child born addicted to heroin could be considered abused within
the meaning of the statute.' However, since no appeal was made, no
higher court ever reviewed the decision. As a result, in 1992, the Ohio
Supreme Court did not apply the reasoning of In Re Ruiz when
interpreting a similar statute.4' Instead, the court held that the criminal
child endangerment statute did not apply to women whose substance
abuse occurred before the birth of the child.42 The court reasoned that
"[t]o construe the statute in this manner would mean that every
expectant woman who ingested a substance with the potential of harm
to her child, e.g., alcohol or nicotine, would be criminally liable under
[the child endangering statute]."43 The court did not believe the state
legislature intended this result.'
A recent review of a criminal child abuse case occurred in Reinesto
v. Superior Court,45 which involved a newborn who tested positive for
heroin, experienced heroin withdrawal symptoms, and remained in a
special care facility until it was one month old.' The state of Arizona
38. 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).

39. Id. at 939.
40. Id. at 939. The court looked at the common law and its refusal to give a fetus legal
protection. However, it then determined that in Ohio a fetus is given intestate rights, and is
allowed to recover in a prenatal injury action if subsequently born alive or still, or in a
wrongful death action. Id. at 936-37. In addition, the court broadly interpreted Roe v. Wade
and argued that "the state's interest in the potential human life at the time of viability... compel[led] a holding that a viable unborn fetus ... be considered a child under the
provisions" of the child abuse statute. Id. at 938.
41. Ohio v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992), affg 568 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1991).
42. Id. at 713. The court interpreted the term "parent" in the statute and claimed that
Gray did not become a parent until the child was born alive. Id. at 711.
43. Id. at 712.
44. Id.
45. 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).,
46. Id. at 734.
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alleged that the mother violated the Arizona criminal child abuse statute
by knowingly causing an injury to her child that was likely to produce
death or serious injury through her ingestion of heroin during pregnancy.47 The Arizona Court of Appeals opined that if the legislature, while
drafting the child abuse statute, intended to include activities of the
mother that affect a fetus and which ultimately does harm to the child
after birth, it would have done so specifically.48 Since the court found
the statute did not apply under these circumstances, it did not reach the
constitutional issue raised by the mother that the charges brought against
her invaded her right to privacy.49
In Collins v. Texas,0 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
a woman charged with reckless injury to a child for voluntarily ingesting
cocaine during pregnancy could not be so charged, since she had no
notice that such conduct could subject her to prosecution when her child
exhibited symptoms of cocaine withdrawal at birth.5 ' The court applied
the "void for vagueness" doctrine, which requires that a penal statute
"define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.""2 Since
the Texas penal code did not proscribe any conduct with respect to a
fetus and the legislature's definitions of "child," "person," or "individual"
limited the penal laws to conduct committed against a living human
being who was born, the reckless injury to a child statute was impermissibly vague as it applied to the mother's conduct.53 The Texas court
resolved the issue on non-constitutional grounds and never ruled on the
constitutional challenges raised by the mother.54
The above cases, and many other similar cases brought in different
47. Id. The statute used by the state applies to "any person" who "[u]nder circumstances
likely to produce death or serious physical injury... causes a child to suffer physical injury."
ARIz. REV.STAT. ANN. §13-3623(B) (1996). A child is defined as "an individual who is under
eighteen years of age" and physical injury is defined as "the impairment of physical condition... or any physical condition which imperils ... health or welfare." ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3623(A) (1996).
48. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 735.
49. Id. at 738.
50. 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
51. Id. at 894, 898.
52. Id. at 897 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
53. Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 897-98. The court noted that the state's attempt to bring the
mother's conduct within reach of the statute was "creative," but held that the mother could
be prosecuted not for the result of her conduct-injury to her child-but only for the conduct
itself, her ingestion of cocaine. Id. at 898.
54. Id. at 896.
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jurisdictions,5 express the courts' view that it is improper to uphold a
criminal conviction of a woman for criminal child abuse, neglect, or
endangerment absent the legislature's specific intent to include the fetus
or the mother's conduct within the meaning of the applicable statute.
However, the courts' conclusion that a woman is not put on notice
that her conduct could be considered criminal is debatable.56 Although
a woman may not know that her actions would specifically be criminal
within a prosecutor's stretched interpretation of some statutes, she
inevitably knows that what she is doing constitutes a crime. Actual use
or ingestion of a controlled substance already incurs criminal penalties. 7 Also, based on the extensive medical information available to
pregnant women concerning the potential hazardous effects associated
with the woman's prenatal behavior," the woman knows that ingesting
the controlled substance during pregnancy will impair the health and
welfare of her child.
In 1996, the Supreme Court of South Carolina became the first
highest court of a state to uphold criminal child neglect prosecution of
a woman for her ingestion of cocaine during pregnancy.59 Despite the
trend set by the previously mentioned jurisdictions, the court held that
"the word 'child' as used in [the child abuse and endangerment]
statute[s] includes [a] viable fetus."' Based on the previous case law
in South Carolina recognizing a viable fetus as a person in the homicide
laws and wrongful death statutes, the court stated it would be absurd not
to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of child abuse

55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (holding criminal child
abuse statute did not apply to use of controlled substances during pregnancy as intended by
the legislature; criminal prosecution would violate due process right of fair notice since unconstitutionally vague); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1992) (stating legislature did not
intend to include acts endangering unborn fetus in endangering welfare of child statute, so
charging mother would violate her constitutional due process right to fair notice).

56. See, e.g., Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 893; Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 280.

57. See Legal Interventions, supra note 3, at 2667-68.
58. See generally Nelson et al., supra note 3, at 711-12 (discussing the effects of maternal
behavior with respect to nutrition, cigarette smoking, alcohol and illegal substance intake on
fetal development).
59. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *1 (S.C. July 15, 1996) (this opinion
had not been released for publication in the permanent law reports and until released, is
subject to revision or withdrawal).
60. Id. This case came before the Supreme Court of South Carolina after a woman had
pleaded guilty to the charges of child abuse and was already serving a seven year sentence for
such crime. Id.
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statutes.61
2. Delivery and Possession
TWo other types of criminal charges that have been brought against
a woman who ingests controlled substances during her pregnancy are
delivery of an illegal substance to the newborn and possession of an
illegal substance based on the presence of residual drug metabolites in
the newborn's urine sample.
The Supreme Court of Florida undertook an extensive examination
of prosecuting a mother for delivery of a controlled substance to her
newborn in Johnson v. Florida.62 First, the court reviewed the legislative history, intent, and purpose of the delivery statute and concluded
that the legislature never intended to include women who take illegal
drugs and deliver these drugs to an unborn child through the umbilical
cord.63 Then, the court recognized the prenatal substance abuse crisis
and acknowledged that the Florida legislature had chosen to deal with
the crisis by placing a child into the custody of protective services, rather
than by criminally prosecuting the mother.' In conclusion, the court
examined multiple medical reports searching for possible ramifications
of criminal prosecutions. The court found that prosecutions are the least
effective response to the crisis because
[r]ather than face the possibility of prosecution, [many women]
may simply avoid prenatal or medical care for fear of being
detected. Yet the newborns of these women are, as a group, the
most fragile and sick, and most in need of hospital neonatal care.
A decision to deliver these babies "at home" will have tragic and
serious consequences.65
Michigan's courts have also reviewed convictions for delivery of

61. Id. at *3. The Children's Code, with respect to the child neglect statutes, in no way
suggests that it be applied only to born children, or those with a birthdate. Id. at *6 (distinguishing the dissent's reliance on another South Carolina case that stated a child in the
adoption context must be born because the date of birth requirement on the consent form
could only be fulfilled after the birth of the child).
62. 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), quashing 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).
63. Id. at 1292-94. Since the legislature had strictly set out a statute which provided that
a parent could not be subject to criminal investigation based solely on a newborn's drug
dependency, the court concluded that the legislature obviously never intended criminal
prosecution for general delivery under these circumstances. Id.
64. Id. at 1295.
65. Id. at 1295-96. The court looked at reports from the American Medical Association,
the California Medical Association, and Florida's Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative
Services to reach its conclusion. Id.
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illegal substances to newborns and have concluded that such activity was
not intended to be covered by the legislature when it enacted the
delivery statute.' When reviewing criminal convictions of possession,
many courts consider the evidence of the metabolites in the newborn's
urinalysis to be insufficient to constitute possession, and, therefore, fail
to find the women guilty of possession.67
The effort taken by state prosecutors to criminalize prenatal
substance abuse is apparent from the extensive steps taken to interpret
criminal statutes to include a woman's behavior during pregnancy. These
efforts deserve credit because the state clearly acknowledges the problem
and is desperately seeking a way to hold these women accountable for
their actions. However, it is understandable why, absent specific
legislation criminalizing a woman's behavior during pregnancy, the courts
are unwilling to independently expand statutes to include this behavior.
Deciding these criminal cases on nonconstitutional grounds has allowed
the courts to avoid the constitutional issue of whether the state's
compelling interest to protect the potential lives that sustain harmful
injuries from the mother's use of illegal substances outweighs the
mother's constitutionally protected privacy right. The courts and
legislatures are well aware of the prenatal substance abuse crisis, but
perhaps, by not affirming criminal convictions, the courts are sending a
message to the legislature to specifically define the word "person" or
"child" in the statutes.
B Legislative Response
Some states have passed legislation expressing the principle that drug
addiction in a newborn constitutes child abuse or neglect.6" It is clear
66. People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Bremer, No.
90-3222-7-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1991) (interpreting the delivery statute to cover ingestion of
cocaine by a pregnant woman would be a "radical incursion" upon existing law since a person
may not be punished for a crime unless the acts committed fall clearly within the statute's
language).
67. See Jackson v. State, 833 S.W.2d 220,223 (rex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding presence
of residual drugs in an infant cannot be grounds for charging mother with possession). See
also Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E2d 717, 720 n.7 (Mass. 1993) (recognizing the
majority rule that absent other evidence, presence of a controlled substance in one's body does
not constitute criminal possession) (citations omitted).
68. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(g)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating drug
dependency of newborn is ground for suspicion of child abuse and neglect, but cannot be the
sole basis of the criminal investigation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (1997) (defining
neglect to include prenatal exposure to a controlled substance used by mother detected by
withdrawal symptoms, results of a toxicology test on child or mother after delivery, or
developmental delays during the child's first year).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:793

from the express provisions of these statutes that the legislature
specifically intended to criminalize such conduct. For example, a
Massachusetts statute requires hospital personnel to notify the Department of Social Services immediately if the physician reasonably believes
that a child is physically dependent on a drug at birth.69 The presence
of drug addiction in the newborn constitutes child abuse.70
A few state legislatures have proposed, but failed to pass, novel
legislation to combat the prenatal substance abuse crisis. For example,
in Ohio, legislation was proposed, but never enacted, to temporarily
sterilize a woman with Norplant® if she was convicted of fetal abuse.71
Also, in Idaho, the governor introduced, but later withdrew, a bill to
have drug-dependent pregnant women civilly committed.7'
In response to the decisions in Reinesto73 and In the Matter of the
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action,74 an Arizona senator
is proposing a bill to allow state or county health officials to prosecute
pregnant women who use illegal drugs or "harmful" amounts of alcohol
as criminal child abusers.75 Therefore, it appears that the courts'
requests for specific legislation on these matters are finally being
addressed.
C. Possible Ramifications
State prosecutors contend that criminally prosecuting women who
have used controlled substances during pregnancy will remedy the
prenatal substance abuse problem in this country. They argue that these

69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 1990).
70. Pellegrini,608 N.E.2d at 720-22. Upon review of a criminal indictment of a mother
for possession of cocaine in a newborn, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
remanded the case to the Superior Court and recognized that the evidence of the drug
metabolites found in the newborn's urine may not constitute possession, but is probative of
neglect under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §51A. Id.
71. DANIELS, supra note 12, at 105. Norplant is the most effective reversible prescription
birth control method used today, in which six soft capsules are inserted under the skin of the
woman's upper arm. The benefit of Norplant is that it will be effective birth control for five
years, or until it is clinically removed. JOHN KNOWLES, FACTS ABOUT BIRTH CONTROL 6-8
(1995).
72. DANIELS, supra note 12, at 105.
73. 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
74. 905 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a pattern of substance abuse does
not suggest unfitness, inability to parent, or justification to terminate parental rights).
75. Howard Fischer, Bill Would Target PregnantDrug,Alcohol Abusers, THE ARIZONA
DAILY STAR, Jan. 27, 1996, at 1B, availablein 1996 WL 4980308. The Bill would only require
health officials to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the life or health of an
unborn child is imperiled. Id.
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criminal convictions will punish women for their illegal conduct,
generally deter future substance abuse by women during pregnancy, and
prevent damage to fetal health.76 However, the American Medical
Association has extensively examined the potential ramifications of
instituting postnatal criminal sanctions, and it has concluded not only
that the goals of the state will not be achieved, but also that criminal
prosecutions may exacerbate the problem.77
The states first contend that criminal sanctions will punish pregnant
women and work effectively to deter substance abuse during pregnancy.
However, although penalties already exist for using illegal substances,
pregnant women currently do not seem to be deterred.78 Therefore,
any additional penalties may also be disregarded.79 In addition,
delivering a healthy child is a general incentive for most pregnant women
to refrain from potentially harmful behavior. If that incentive is not
sufficient to prevent harmful behavior, "it is questionable that criminal
sanctions would provide the additional motivation needed to avoid
behaviors that may cause fetal harm."8 °
Second, states assert that fetal health will be protected by these
criminal sanctions. However, incarceration of a pregnant woman will not
ensure fetal health. Typically, prisons have inadequate health care
facilities and resources and consequently, women will be placed into
conditions that are hazardous to fetal health.8 Finally, if a woman is
incarcerated after she becomes pregnant, the damage to the fetus might
have already occurred, so the fetal health goal will not be attained.
Although public opinion favors prosecuting and incarcerating a new
mother if her substance abuse impairs her child,8' it is clear that
criminal prosecutions are not remedying the prenatal substance abuse
crisis. Courts, without specific legislative guidance, fail to consider the

76. Legal Interventions,supra note 3, at 2667.
77. Id. The problem will be exacerbated because it will lead women to avoid prenatal
or medical care for fear of being detected and criminally charged. Id.
78. See, e.g., supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
79. Legal Interventions,supra note 3, at 2668.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 2667. The hazardous environment for fetal health includes the unsanitary
environment, improper diet, and minimal access to exercise or physical activity received in
prison. In addition, drugs are readily available in prisons, so incarceration would not
necessarily prevent the woman's drug use. Id.
82. See Edward Tivnan, Life and Death Decisions: Should Child Abusers Be Sterilized?
The New MoralDilemmas,FAM. CIRCLE MAG., Mar. 10, 1992, at 99,102 (discussing telephone
survey of 768 randomly selected people indicating that most favored criminal prosection and
incarceration of prenatal substance abusing mothers).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:793

fetus a person with respect to the criminal statutes and fail to extend the
reach of criminal statutes to a woman's prenatal substance abuse. In
addition, few state legislatures have responded by expanding criminal
statutes to include prenatal substance abuse despite the courts' request
to re-examine and re-define such statutes. Furthermore, the possible
ramifications of these criminal prosecutions prove that the goals of the
state, including the state's ultimate goal-protecting the potential life of
the child-will not be achieved. If criminal prosecution will not achieve
the state's goals, what will? A solution to this national crisis must exist.
Until 1995, no state had successfully approached the crisis of prenatal
substance abuse by court-ordered protective custody of the fetus.' This
action would detain a viable fetus in a local hospital for treatment and
protection from its substance abusing mother. However, Wisconsin
applied this approach through its Children's Code, and the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals upheld the protective custody order in State ex rel
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki.8 4
III. THE NOVEL

APPROACH: STATE EX REL. ANGELA M.W V.
KRUZICK 85

A. The Wisconsin Approach
In State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki,86 instead of trying to
criminally prosecute the unborn child's mother for her consistent use of
drugs, Wisconsin used its Children's Code' to physically detain the
fetus and mother before birth. The Waukesha County Department of
Health and Human Services ("The County") sought a protective custody

83. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a juvenile court order which gave
the county social welfare agency temporary custody of a fetus as a "deprived child without
proper parental care necessary for his or her physical health." Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457,459 (Ga. 1981). The result was attained after the woman
refused, based on religious reasons, to have a Cesarian section that would save the fetus. Id.
84. 197 Wis. 2d 532,541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted,546 N.W.2d 468 (Wis.
1996).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes is entitled "The Children's Code." WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.01-48.999 (West Supp. 1997). The Children's Code is intended to be liberally
construed and its paramount goal is to "protect children, to preserve the unity of the family,
whenever appropriate, by strengthening family life through assisting parents, whenever
appropriate, in fulfilling their parental responsibilities." WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(1)(a) (West
1997).
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orders in juvenile court over the viable fetus when an obstetrician
reported the possibility of child abuse by a pregnant patient, Angela
M.W., who repeatedly tested positive for cocaine during her pregnancy. 9 The juvenile court subsequently granted the protective custody
order.90
The County subsequently ified a Children in Need of Health and
Protective Services (CHIPS) petition with the juvenile court, which
alleged the fetus was in need of protection because its "parent... neglects, refuses or is unable for reasons other than poverty to
provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care or shelter
so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child." 9' The
juvenile court conducted a detention hearing to determine whether the
fetus and mother should continue to be held in custody.92 Angela, by
counsel, objected to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.93 However,
the court denied the jurisdictional challenge, entered a denial on
Angela's behalf at the initial hearing, and scheduled a jury trial.94
B. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Response
Angela responded by bringing an original action in the court of
appeals seeking a writ of habeas corpus releasing her from the protective
custody. In the alternative, she sought a supervisory writ barring the
juvenile court from exercising jurisdiction in the pending CHIPS

88. The juvenile court is authorized to take a child into custody by "[a]n order of the
judge if made upon a showing satisfactory to the judge that the welfare of the child demands
that the child be immediately removed from his or her present custody." Wis. STAT. § 48.19
(1)(c)(1993-94).
89. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 539-541,541 N.W.2d at 485. The obstetrician originally
advised Angela to seek voluntary inpatient treatment when four different drug-screening tests
confirmed the presence of cocaine or other drugs in Angela's blood, but Angela declined. Id.
The obstetrician's duty to report is based on Wis. STAT. § 48.981(2)(1993-94), which generally
requires a physician to report instances of suspected child abuse or neglect; such instances
must be based on reasonable cause. Wis. STAT. § 48.981(2)(1993-94).
90. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 540, 541 N.W.2d at 485.
91. Id. at 541, 541 N.W.2d at 485 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 48.13(10) (1993-94)). Included
with the petition was an affidavit reflecting Angela's treating obstetrician's opinions and concerns. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 541, 541 N.W.2d at 485.
92. Id. at 542, 541 N.W.2d at 485. Since Angela presented herself for inpatient drug
treatment, the original order allowed her to choose the treatment facility, but stated that if she
left the facility, she and the fetus would be held at Waukesha Memorial Hospital. Therefore,
to continue such custody, the court held the detention hearing pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 48.21
(1)(a) (1993-94).
93. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d. at 542, 541 N.W.2d at 485.
94. Id. at 542-43, 541 N.W.2d at 485-86.
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proceeding. s
As an issue of first impression in Wisconsin, the court of appeals
examined whether the juvenile court had CHIPS jurisdiction over Angela
or her viable fetus, and whether the protective custody order violated
Angela's constitutional due process and equal protection rights. 96 The
underlying issue raised in the case was whether a viable fetus was a child
within the meaning of the Children's Code. 97
1. Jurisdictional Review
The court considered both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the juvenile court over Angela and her fetus.98 In reviewing the
subject matter jurisdiction, the court had to determine whether a viable
fetus was considered a "child" as defined in the Children's Code. The
court held that "reasonable minds could differ as to whether the
statutory definition of a child applie[d] to a viable fetus in a CHIPS
proceeding."99 Therefore, based on public policy expressed by (1) the
United States Supreme Court in Roe and its progeny,1°° (2) the
Wisconsin legislature when enacting the Children's Code and defining its
purposes, 1 ' and (3) the Wisconsin Supreme Court as addressed in its
approach to the legal status of a fetus,2 the court concluded that a
95. Id. at 543, 541 N.W.2d at 486.
96. Id. at 544, 541 N.W.2d at 486-87.
97. Id. at 547-60, 541 N.W.2d at 488-93.
98. Id. at 546-63, 541 N.W.2d at 487-494. The juvenile court has "exclusive original
jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of protection or services." Wis. STAT. § 48.13
(1993-94).
99. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 549, 541 N.W.2d at 488.
100. The majority adopted the broad interpretation of Roe v. Wade, failing to accept the
dissent's narrow reading of Roe that it only be applied to abortions. Ud at 551, 541 N.W.2d
at 489; see also supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
101. Since Roe was on the books when the Children's Code legislation was adopted, the
court concluded that "the constitutional way had been cleared for the Wisconsin legislature
to enact legislation .... to promote and protect the potential life represented by a viable
fetus." Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 551,541 N.W.2d at 489. Furthermore, the court rejected
the narrow analysis of Roe as applied to the CHIPS statute since the purpose of the CHIPS
statute is to protect children from the risk of physical harm. "That [purpose] can hardly be
achieved if the potential life of a viable fetus, a legitimate compelling state interest under Roe,
is not provided a safe environment in the womb of its mother and is beyond the reach of the
state in a CHIPS proceeding." Id. at 551-52, 541 N.W.2d at 489.
102. Id. at 554-59, 541 N.W.2d at 490-93. The court analyzed three main Wisconsin
Supreme Court cases: State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639,526 N.W.2d 132 (1994) (recognizing the
states ability to enact and enforce laws to protect the fetus); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co.,
8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (holding a viable fetus has the ability to assert a claim
after birth since it can exist independently); and Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967) (holding a viable fetus is a person for purposes of the
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viable fetus was a child under the Children's Code."°3 As a result, a
viable fetus is entitled to the protection and services of the CHIPS
statute and the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction in the
CHIPS proceeding."
To determine whether the juvenile court had personal jurisdiction,
the court examined personal jurisdiction over both the fetus and over
Angela. Since the guardian ad litem, appointed to appear in the action
for the fetus, had not objected to jurisdiction, all requirements were
satisfied for the viable fetus. 5 When reviewing the personal jurisdiction of the juvenile court over Angela, the court noted that "the statute
neither confers nor requires original jurisdiction over a parent as a
prerequisite to a CHIPS proceeding."'"16 Since Angela and her fetus
were "physically and biologically one," the court addressed the issue of
whose interests and rights should prevail when answering the constitutional arguments made by Angela. °7
2. Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Review
The court set forth the rule of law that a state is required to show
both a compelling interest and a narrowly drawn means to carry out this
interest, if the state is depriving a person of his or her fundamental right
to physical liberty."8 Angela argued that the state did not have a
compelling interest to restrain her under the circumstances because, if
granted a compelling interest in this circumstance, the state could assert
this right when the risk to the fetus is minimal. 9 She also argued that,
if such an interest exists, the steps taken by the juvenile court were too
extreme." 0 The court rejected both of Angela's contentions."'
The court acknowledged that under Roe and its progeny, the state is

wrongful death statute).
103. Angela M.W., 197 Wis.2d at 560, 541 N.W.2d at 493.
104. Md at 560, 541 N.W.2d at 493.
105. Id. at 560-61, 541 N.W.2d at 493.
106. Id. at 561, 541 N.W2d at 493. In addition, the court noted that the protective
custody order over the fetus also required custody over Angela, not because the juvenile court
asserted jurisdiction over Angela, but because Angela and her fetus were "physically and
biologically one." Id. at 562, 541 N.W.2d at 493-94.
107. Id. at 563, 541 N.W.2d at 494.
108. Id. at 565,541 N.W.2d at 495 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,388 (1978)).
109. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 566-67, 569-70, 541 N.W.2d at 495-97.
110. 1d
111. Id.
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granted a compelling interest in the life of the viable fetus."' The
statistics, which reveal the substantial number of drug-exposed newborns,
establish the state's compelling interest, and Roe reinforces the state's
right of intervention."' The court then recognized that the various
scenarios embodied in the CHIPS statute only authorize the state's right
to protect a child in "egregious situations in which a child is at substantial
or serious risk."" 4 Furthermore, the allegations made in CHIPS
proceedings must be supported by reliable and credible information and
there must be probable cause for the juvenile court to exercise its
jurisdiction. 15
As to Angela's argument that the means used by the state in ordering
confinement were too extreme and coercive, the court responded by
acknowledging that the Children's Code explores all the possibilities of
less coercive means and only uses protective custody orders in urgent
situations.116 Therefore, the court believed that the compelling interest
both her
of the state in protecting Angela's viable fetus outweighed
17
constitutional due process and equal protection rights.
3. The Dissent
The Angela M.W.dissent is divided into four different sections. First,
the dissent contends the argument made by the County-that although
the state does not have a statute for fetal abuse it can extend child abuse
to cover fetal abuse-is an "erroneous analogy.""' 8 Second, the dissent
rejects the majority's opinion that the statute is ambiguous on its face or
as applied.1 9 Since the statute defines "child" as a "person who is less
than 18 years of age,""' ° the legislature created a floor of birth and
112. Id. at 565, 541 N.W.2d at 495. The court considered the fact that Roe did not grant
any constitutional right to the fetus, but nonetheless based its holding on the Supreme Court
conclusion in Roe that "nonconstitutional interests were sufficient, after viability, to override
the constitutional right to choice." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1973)). The
court concluded that the state has a compelling interest in situations involving a viable fetus
that override the mother's privacy interest. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 565, 541 N.W.2d at
495.
113. Id. at 565-66, 541 N.W.2d at 495.
114. Id. at 566, 541 N.W.2d at 495.
115. Id. at 566-68, 541 N.W.2d at 495-96.
116. Id. at 568-70, 541 N.W.2d at 496-97.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 572-73,541 N.W.2d at 498 (Anderson, P.J., dissenting) (citing James J. Nocon,
Physicians & Maternal-FetalConflicts: Duties, Rights & Responsibilities,5 J.L. & HEALTH 1,

31-32 (1990-91)).
119. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 573-74,541 N.W.2d at 498 (Anderson, P.J., dissenting).
120. WIS STAT. § 48.02(2) (1993-94).

1997]

COMBATING PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE

ceiling of 18 for the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.121
In addition, the dissent argues that viability is not a fixed event, so
the juvenile court must determine if the fetus has actually reached the
developmental stage of viability, whereas no uncertainty exists if the
floor is at the fixed point of birth." There is some question as to
when viability actually occurs, but the Supreme Court, in deciding Roe
v. Wade," settled on the twenty-four to twenty-eight week period of
viability, allowing the attending physician to determine viability within
this time frame. 24 Also, increased medical advances since Roe have
allowed physicians to more accurately determine when a fetus has
reached viability and can survive on its own."2 Therefore, the juvenile
court would only have to consult a woman's physician to determine if
viability has been reached.
The dissent adopts the narrow approach of Roe and its progeny that
the state's interest is not absolute and the rights of the mother must be
carefully guarded,"2 and agreed with one commentator's view that
"when the health interests of a woman and her fetus conflict, the state
appears to be constitutionally bound to place the woman's interests
above the fetus'."' 27
In the third and fourth sections, the dissent focuses on the consequences and ramifications"2 that the majority's decision may have and
uses them to acknowledge that there are "issues which cannot be
adequately raised, studied, debated and decided in the adversarial
arena."' 29 The legislature is thought to be the best forum to decide the
issue since it is better equipped to deal with maternal-fetal conflicts and

121. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 574,541 N.W.2d at 498-99 (Anderson, P.J, dissenting).
Applying the common law approach of calculating age, the dissent claimed that the statute is
not ambiguous since "age is measured from the time of birth, not conception, not quickening
and not viability, and one cannot be a child by definition until he or she has been born and
his or her age has begun to accrue." Id. (citing In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 760 (Conn.

1992)).
122. Id. at 574-75, 541 N.W.2d at 499 (Anderson, PJ., dissenting).
123. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
124. Id.
125. See generally DANIELS, supra note 12, at 17-19 (suggesting that despite hopes of
being able to consider the fetus viable prior to the twenty-third or twenty-fourth week, fetal
survival is based on lung capacity which does not develop until this time).
126. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
127. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 580, 541 N.W.2d at 501 (citation omitted).
128. The fourth section looked extensively at the American Medical Association's
discussion concerning the consequences of intervention in response to prenatal substance
abuse. Id. at 586-92, 541 N.W.2d at 503-06.
129. Id. at 593, 541 N.W.2d at 506.
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issues of statewide concern.'o
However, the judiciary has discretionary decision-making powers and
the ability to decide issues of statewide concern by interpreting and
giving purpose to the legal rules based on public policy.' It is, as the
majority explains, the judiciary's obligation, in the interest of justice, to
decide the cases based on the applicable facts and law.13 ' The crisis of
prenatal substance abuse concerns the child's welfare, and if such statutes
exist to protect that welfare, i.e., The Children's Code, it is unconscionable to refrain from action prior to birth when the child's health and
welfare is most vulnerable and ultimately at stake.
Although it is argued that judicial intervention is not always
appropriate, one state supreme court has concluded that if the woman's
behavior is egregious, placing her viable fetus at great risk, and the
desired treatment holds little or no danger to the woman, then the court
must intervene to preserve the life of the fetus. 3 In Angela's case, it
is apparent that her conduct, abusing cocaine, was egregious and placed
a great risk on her child. The court-ordered protective custody not only
produced a clear-cut benefit for Angela's fetus, protecting it from
Angela's cocaine use, it also benefitted Angela in that she refrained from
taking controlled substances.
V.

COURT-ORDERED PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Although court-ordered protective custody may appear extreme and
unnecessary to some, the state has previously been granted the power to
confine an individual for the benefit of a third person. For example,
quarantine regulations have existed to prevent the spread of communicable diseases and to preserve the public health."M The quarantine
statutes allow the government 1to
hold an individual against his will for
35
the protection of a third party.
Similar to the protective custody at issue, courts have also previously
ordered confinement of a pregnant woman and her fetus when the

130. Id. at 581, 541 N.W.2d at 501. The dissent believes that, "[a] court which seeks the
truth through the adversarial process is ill-equipped to make public policy in the sensitive
areas surrounding maternal-fetal conflicts." Id.
131. Id. at 544, 541 N.W.2d at 486.
132. Id.
133. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
134. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 264-271 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
135. See id.

1997]

COMBATING PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE

woman refused to comply with lifesaving medical treatment for the
fetus. 6 This form of custody requires the woman to undergo major
surgery," in addition to being admitted to a hospital. Although some
13 8
courts have granted such forced medical treatment and confinement,
bear any increased risk to her health
others fail to require the mother to
139
in order to save her viable fetus.

Therefore, since people have previously been held against their will
for the protection of a third party, it seems only logical to allow the state
to protect an unborn viable fetus from the dangerous controlled
substances his or her mother may be ingesting.
A.

Merits of Court-OrderedProtective Custody

If a state has a compelling interest over the life of a fetus, such that
a court may order confinement of a woman who tests positive for
controlled substances during pregnancy, both of the state's goals in
combating prenatal substance abuse-protecting the fetus and punishing
the mother-may be attained. Since the woman could be hospitalized
during viability, the fetus would be protected from exposure to
controlled substances up until birth. Although some damage may
already have been done, due to exposure to these controlled substances
increase
prior to viability,"4 the chances of delivering a healthy child
1 41
when the child is not exposed in the last stage of pregnancy.
One of the merits of court-ordered protective custody prior to birth
is determined by considering the costs incurred by an unhealthy infant,
including the emotional and psychological burdens and monetary costs
on the parents, insurance companies, hospitals, and society. 42 It is
believed that most of the women likely to be prosecuted for prenatal
substance abuse are those from lower economic backgrounds, who are

136. See BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS
OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 146-50 (1992).
137. See id. The most common form of such confinement comes by emergency cesarean
section orders. Instead of giving birth vaginally, the woman must undergo a surgery, a
cesarean section. These orders come despite the view that most cesarean operations are
unnecessary. Id. at 149.
138. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
139. See generally STEINBOCK, supra note 136, at 150-63.
140. Legal Interventions,supra note 3, at 2666-67.
141. See Volpe, supra note 3, at 404. The baby is less likely to be addicted when not
exposed to controlled substances during the last two months of the pregnancy, and therefore
will not go through withdrawals when born.
142. Cahalane, supra note 31, at 216.
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often uninsured or underinsured.143 Therefore, the state and society
incur financial burden of these women's pregnancies.
Protective custody of a woman in a hospital prior to labor has a
relatively low cost compared to the high costs of treating an unhealthy
newborn. For example, the average rate of a hospital room is $400 per
day, but based on the needs of a newborn addicted to a controlled
substance, the average neo-natal intensive care unit rate is $4,000 per
day.144 Therefore, protective custody at viability145 for prenatal substance abuse would cost approximately $33,600, compared to the
$120,000 incurred by an addicted and seriously ill newborn who may
need to stay in the neo-natal intensive-care unit for a month. These
figures suggest that court-ordered protective custody will keep the costs
of health care down for substance abusing pregnant women and their
newborns. This, in turn, will decrease the cost incurred by society and
the state.
Although the AMA Board of Trustees believes that judicial
intervention is inappropriate in most cases, they have released the
statement that
[i]f an exceptional circumstance could be found in
which... treatment poses an insignificant-or-no health risk to
the woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and
would clearly prevent substantial and irreversible harm to her
fetus, it might be appropriate for a physician to seek [court
ordered protective custody]. 14'
This exceptional circumstance clearly exists with respect to substanceabusing pregnant women. No health risk is posed on the pregnant
woman. In fact, if the woman is treated for her addiction while in
custody, she may benefit from the hospital confinement by overcoming
her addiction. All of the potential effects of controlled substances are

143. See Legal Interventions, supra note 3, at 2668.
144. Average neo-natal intensive care unit rates are divided into three different levels.
Level 1, with an average cost of $2,710 a day, is normally used for an infant with a low birth
weight that needs more care than is provided in the typical nursery. Level II, with an average
cost of $3,230 a day, is used for an infant who does not require a ventilator but is somewhat
ill and needs to be monitored for general health and weight gain. Level III, which costs an
average of $5,300 a day, is used for those babies who continuously require a ventilator, may
need surgery, and may have brain damage. Telephone Interview with Kate Richards, Patient
Accounting Clerk at Lucille Slater Pachard Children's Hospital of Stanford, Cal. (Feb. 23,
1996).
145. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. For purposes of this example, the
twenty-fourth week was considered viability.
146. See Legal Interventions,supra note 3, at 266.
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not known at this time, but the fetus will naturally benefit from the
confinement, since it will not be born addicted to the substances. Clearly
if both the mother and the fetus benefit from the confinement, it is an
appropriate remedy.
Allowing states to confine pregnant women may have the same
possible ramifications that criminal prosecutions have, including causing
pregnant women to reject medical or prenatal care.1 47 However, the
above mentioned benefits and justifications of court-ordered confinement
far outweigh the possibilities that these women may avoid medical
treatment.
B. A Callfor Legislative Reform
Since no statute in Wisconsin specifically allowed the state protective
custody over a viable fetus, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was placed
in the position of creating and giving meaning to the law when it
interpreted The Children's Code.' 4 One commentator has suggested
that in prenatal drug addiction cases,
[w]hen there are no rules, the probability of discretionary
decisionmaking is greatly enhanced. Moreover, when child
welfare is at issue, and medical and legal uncertainties continue
to surround maternal fitness at various stages of addiction and
recovery, judges are sometimes left no alternative but to "legislate," by creating new rules or ignoring existing laws. 49
Why should the courts be placed in such a precarious position of having
to define these terms? To ensure that the courts are not placed in this
situation, state legislatures need to specifically define the applicability of
the Children's Code to a viable fetus.
The legislature, as the dissent points out in State ex. rel Angela M.W.
v. Kruzicki, is well equipped to deal with this issue. If the legislatures
spoke clearly and specifically identified the approach to be taken by the
courts, the courts would not have to guess how the legislature intended

147. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
148. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App.
1995), cerL granted,546 N.W.2d 468 (Wis. 1996). Similarly, in the criminal context, only one
supreme court has upheld the criminal prosecution of a woman who ingested cocaine during
her pregnancy, and this court interpreted other law from the state to suggest the particular
statute included a viable fetus. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *1 (S.C. July
15, 1996) (this opinion had not been released for publication in the permanent law reports and
until released, is subject to revision or withdrawal).
149. Sandra Anderson Garcia, DrugAddiction and Mother/Child Welfare, 13 J. LEGAL
MED. 129, 196 (1992).
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the statute to be interpreted.
Many states, like Wisconsin, already have the ability to take a child,
presumably a newborn, into protective custody and ensure its health
when a toxicology test on the child is positive for controlled substances. 50 In these states, the legislature would need to define the term
"child" to include a viable fetus to allow the state to take action.
Similarly, a clearly drawn statute could designate when the state was able
to take action, i.e., before or after viability, or what week during the
pregnancy, and under what circumstances the state could take action, i.e,
upon multiple positive testings for controlled substances or alcohol in the
system.
Court-ordered protective custody appears to be the only solution
suggested thus far that attains the states' goals. If the legislatures
continue to avoid the issue, the courts have no alternative but to define
the statutes as they see fit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Estimates suggest that by the year 2000 about 4,000,000 Americans
will have been exposed to controlled substances in utero.15' The
magnitude of prenatal substance abuse is not diminishing. Something
must be done to protect potential lives from hazardous controlled
substances.
States have continuously tried to remedy the problem by criminal
prosecutions, but this fails to attain the goal of protecting the fetus. In
addition, courts have been unwilling to affirm any conviction if no
specific legislation covers the woman's prenatal conduct. Since criminal
prosecution has failed to remedy the problem, more states need to use
the Wisconsin approach of court-ordered protective custody to protect
the health and welfare of the fetus prior to birth.
It is only logical that the state be able to intervene at viability to
150. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)
(defining neglected or abused minor as "any newborn infant whose blood or urine contains
any amount of a controlled substance.. ."); IND. CODE. ANN. §31-64-3.1 (Burns Supp. 1996)
(defining "child in need of [protective] services" as a child born "addict[ed] to a controlled
substance"); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(1)(b) (Michie 1996) (defining a "child in need
of protection" as any child "suffering from congenital drug addiction or fetal alcohol
syndrome"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9) (West 1992) (defining a "harm" to a child's health
as "physical dependency of a newborn infant" to a controlled dangerous substance); OKLA.
STAT ANN. tit. 10, §7001-1.3(10)(a)(3) (West 1992) (defining "deprived child" as a child in
need of special care or treatment as a result of being "born in a condition of dependence on
a controlled dangerous substance").
151. Siegel, supra note 1, at 14.
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ensure that the fetus' health is protected. If the purpose of CHIPS
statutes is to protect the children from substantial harm, then if that
substantial harm occurs before birth and after fetal viability, the state
should be able to intervene at that time.
The optimal approach is for legislatures to create statutes which
specifically incorporate a viable fetus into the existing child protective
custody statutes. However, without such legislation, other courts, when
reviewing similar confinements, should follow the lead of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, and accept the broad approach of Roe by properly
weighing the state's compelling interests in protecting the viable fetus
over the rights of the mother. The state will therefore attain the goal of
protecting the health and welfare of the fetus, and the number of babies
born each year addicted to a controlled substance will inevitably fall.
CYNTHIA L. GLAZE

